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WHO ARE THESE "COLTS?": THE
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION,
CONSUMER SURVEY EVIDENCE AND
TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT IN
INDIANAPOLIS COLTS, INC. v.
METROPOLITAN BALTIMORE
FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD.
SEAN H. BROGAN*
I. INTRODUCrION
Modem professional sports merchandising is a multi-million dollar
business. Protecting a team's trademark, therefore, is not only a subset
of intellectual property law, it is also an important component of both
sports and business law.
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club,
Ltd.,' recently decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit), illustrates how professional football is
experiencing a sharp increase in competition for valuable trademarks.
Presently, at least seven professional football teams in the National
Football League (NFL) are considering relocating to another city2 In
the wake of this exodus, the cities abandoned by their former teams will
solicit replacement teams to continue their long-standing tradition of
* B.A., 1992, The Catholic University of America; J.D., 1997, Villanova University School
of Law. This article is dedicated to my parents, whose great love, support and sacrifice cannot
possibly be repaid. I only hope that they understand how much they are loved and
appreciated.
1. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. Peter King, Down... and Out: Citing His Crushing Debts, Art Modell is Taking His
Browns to Baltimore, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 13, 1995, at 28, 30. These teams include: the
Houston Oilers, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Arizona Cardinals, Cincinnati Bengals, Chicago
Bears, Detroit Lions and the Seattle Seahawks. Id. at 32-33. It has also been suggested that
the New England Patriots may pursue relocation options. Ron Reid, On The NFL: Your 1995
Owners' Scorecard, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 15,1995, at C1 (suggesting New England is consid-
ered a restless franchise whose owner is unhappy with his current location). See also Steve
Wulf, Bad Bounces for the N.F.L., Ti m, Dec. 11, 1995, at 64 (listing NFL teams currently
considering relocation and asking "What does the N.F.L. stand for? ... No Fixed Location?
No Fan Loyalty? National Flux League?").
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professional football.3 A significant consequence of this trend will in-
clude clashes over the rights to valuable team logos and other trade-
marks. This disturbing new era in professional sports is being referred to
as "Franchise Free Agency.
'
"
4
The Seventh Circuit had the unique opportunity to establish a worka-
ble legal framework through which trademark clashes would be litigated
in Indianapolis Colts. Unfortunately, the court failed to concretely de-
fine the manner in which such trademark disputes should be adjudicated.
In this decision, the Seventh Circuit held that a Canadian Football
League (CFL) expansion team infringed on the trademark of an NFL
team.5 In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed three fundamen-
tal issues of trademark litigation. First, the court faced the issue of how a
party in a trademark action should make the required showing of a "like-
lihood of confusion." 6 Second, the court considered the amount of
weight that should be given to consumer survey evidence in making this
"likelihood of confusion" determination.7 Third, the court addressed the
effect that should be given to a judicial determination that a contested
trademark had been abandoned.8
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit failed to properly ana-
lyze all of the factors relevant to the "likelihood of confusion" determi-
nation and, instead, gave excessive weight to consumer survey evidence.
At the same time, the court disregarded a valid defense available to the
defendant. The court's treatment of these three issues leaves considera-
ble doubt as to whether future trademark litigation of this type will be
properly decided.
3. See Steve Rushin, The Heart of a City: Cleveland Won Round 1 In What Will Be an
Agonizing Battle to Hold On to Its Beloved Browns, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 4, 1995, at 59
(detailing fifty year tradition of die-hard fan support for Cleveland's professional football
team).
4. King, supra note 2, at 28-29. In the NFL, "Franchise Free Agency" describes the antici-
pated relocation of as many as seven teams, due to the changing economic circumstances
facing team owners. Id. at 30,32. See also Lewis Lord, Make Way for His Baltimore Browns,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 20, 1995, at 41 ("In this dollar-driven decade, it's no surprise
that free-agency franchises are all the rage in the National Football League").
5. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416. The Seventh Circuit's decision affirmed the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff, the Indianapolis Colts. Id.
6. Id. at 412-14. For a full discussion of the court's treatment of the "likelihood of confu-
sion" determination, see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
7. Id. at 414-16. For a full discussion of the court's treatment of consumer survey evi-
dence, see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
8. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412-13. For a full discussion of the court's treatment of
trademark abandonment, see infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
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This article will examine the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the three
issues discussed above in the context of past precedent and current
trends in trademark law. Section II of this article presents the factual
foundation leading up to the Indianapolis Colts litigation. Section III
examines the legal background of the three issues, focusing on Seventh
Circuit jurisprudence. Section IV analyzes the reasoning employed by
the Seventh Circuit in reaching its decision in Indianapolis Colts, as well
as the strengths and weaknesses of this reasoning. Lastly, sections V and
VI suggest the effect that the Seventh Circuit's holding will have on this
rapidly developing area of sports law.
II. FAC-rs
In 1952, the Dallas Texans, a member team of the NFL, moved from
Dallas to Baltimore.9 This team was renamed the "Baltimore Colts."'1
The team remained in Baltimore for thirty-two years, becoming "one of
the most illustrious teams in the history of professional football.""
In 1984, the team owner, Robert Irsay, obtained permission from the
NFL to move the team to Indianapolis where the team was renamed the
"Indianapolis Colts."' 2 This surprise move outraged the citizens of Bal-
timore.' 3 The City of Baltimore instituted litigation in a vain attempt to
block the team's relocation to Indianapolis.' 4
9. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411. The court began its discussion of the case by re-
counting the series of events that led up to the recent dispute over the use of the name "Balti-
more Colts."
10. Id. See John Steadman, Colts Name, CFL Style, is Worth Fight, BALTIMORE EVENING
SUN, Jan. 26, 1994, at D1 (explaining name "Colts" for Baltimore team was "suggestion of a
fan ... who submitted [it as] the winning entry in a contest ...").
11. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411. See also Dave Sottile, Playing the Name Game,
YORK DAILY R c., July 31, 1994, at 7 (stating jam-packed Colts' home game "was often re-
ferred to as the world's largest outdoor insane asylum during the glory years..
12. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411.
13. Id. See also Ted Curtis & Joel H. Stempler, So What Do We Name the Team? Trade-
mark Infringement, the Lanham Act and Sports Franchises, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 23,
29-30 (1995) (asserting Irsay is "most hated man in Maryland" because of clandestine move);
Jon Morgan, Hearing Ends, Ruling Due Monday in Suit Over Use of CFL Colts Name, BALTI-
MORE SUN, June 25, 1994, at Cl (expressing sentiment that Irsay "poisoned the waters" for
his NFL franchise in opinion of Baltimore citizens).
14. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411. The City of Baltimore tried to get the team back by
condemnation under its power of eminent domain. Id. The Indianapolis Colts responded by
bringing a countersuit. Id Neither party was successful in the litigation. Id. (citing Indianap-
olis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Indianapolis
Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733 F.2d 484 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
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In February of 1994, the Canadian Football League (CFL) granted a
franchise for an expansion team to be located in Baltimore.15 A few
days before that franchise was granted, the NFL sent the Commissioner
of the CFL a letter requesting that the CFL discontinue plans to use the
name "Baltimore Colts."' 6 The NFL's letter threatened legal action if
the CFL did not honor the request.17
Nonetheless, the new Baltimore franchise owner, James L. Speros,
announced that his team would be named the "Baltimore CFL Colts."' 8
This announcement coincided with the team being publicly launched,
merchandise licensed, and other steps being taken to prepare for the
commencement of play.' 9 One of the steps taken by Speros was registra-
tion with the United States Patent and Trademark Office for trademark
rights to the name "Baltimore Colts," as well as "Baltimore CFL Colts,"
more than a year after NFL Properties failed to renew its federal regis-
tration for the name "Baltimore Colts."20 Speros subsequently filed a
15. The CFL is a professional football league operating out of Canada which, at the time
of this case, had four teams located in American cities. Id. The CFL has no affiliation with the
NFL, and the CFL version of football is distinct from the one played in the NFL. Ken Mur-
ray, Basketball-Like Pace Sets Canadian Games Apart from Its NFL Counterpart, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 5, 1994, at D1 (discussing difference between how football is played in NFL and
CFL, as well as chronology of formation of Baltimore's CFL team).
16. Ken Murray, NFL Vows to Saddle CFL With Suit Over Colts Name, BALTIMORE SUN,
Feb. 12, 1994, at 1C. The letter was sent by John Flood, President of NFL Properties. Id.
NFL Properties is the merchandising branch of the NFL, and "[plursuant to an agreement
between the NFL clubs and the NFL Trust, NFL Properties has the power and standing to
enforce the league's marks." Steven N. Geise, Comment, A Whole New Ballgame: The Appli-
cation of Trademark Law to Sports Mark Litigation, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 553, 567
(1995).
17. Murray, supra note 16, at C1 ("The NFL... faxed a letter to CFL commissioner Larry
Smith asking him to discontinue plans to use the name Baltimore Colts.").
18. Dave Sottile, CFL Brings Colts Back to Baltimore: The NFL Denied the Handoff, But
the Canadian League Wants to Give the People What They Want, YORK DAILY REc., Mar. 2,
1994, at 1. Speros claimed that he solicited advice concerning the team name from a broad
cross-section of the Baltimore community, including the media, fans, women and children, all
of whom seemed to come up with the same name repeatedly. Id. Speros explained:
I did this for the fans of Baltimore... There has been an issue with NFL Properties
over the use of the name, and in our minds this seems to clear up any confusion. Our
official name is the Baltimore CFL Colts, so there will [be] no misconception of who we
are and what league we're playing in.
Id.
19. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411.
20. Ken Murray, Speros Calls the Play: CFL Team Sues the NFL, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar.
3, 1994, at D8. Speros filed for the trademark rights on January 27, 1994. Id
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declaratory judgment motion in federal court seeking judicial affirma-
tion that he owned these trademark rights."
Two months later, the Indianapolis Colts, along with the NFL and
NFL Properties, filed suit in an Indiana federal court accusing the CFL
team of trademark infringement.22 The Indianapolis Colts obtained a
preliminary injunction which prevented the new team from using the
name "Colts," "Baltimore Colts," or "Baltimore CFL Colts. '2 3  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the in-
junction, holding that the district court committed no clear error in find-
ing that the Canadian team's "use of the name 'Baltimore CFL Colts'
whether for the team or on merchandise was likely to confuse a substan-
tial number of consumers. '24
III. BACKGROUND
The Seventh Circuit's Indianapolis Colts decision raises concerns
about the interplay of three important issues in a federal trademark in-
fringement action. The first issue is how the required showing of a "like-
lihood of confusion" between the product or service of the trademark
holder and the alleged infringer should be made.2" The second issue
concerns the amount of weight that should be given to consumer survey
evidence in making this "likelihood of confusion" determination. The
third issue involves the effect, or non-effect, of a judicial finding that a
trademark holder has abandoned a contested trademark.
21. Jerry Bonkowski, NFL Sues Over CFL Colts Use In Baltimore, USA TODAY, May 3,
1994, at C10. Speros' lawyers filed the motion for declaratory judgment on Mar. 1, 1994.
Murray, supra note 15, at Dl.
22. John R. O'Neill, NFL Colts Blitzing CFL Colts: NFL Joins Lawsuit Charging Trade-
mark of Name, INDiANAPOLiS STAR, Apr. 30, 1994, at Bi. The suit alleged that the CFL Colts
had acted in bad faith by adopting trademarks "virtually identical" to those of the Indianapo-
lis Colts. Id. The suit also alleged that the CFL Colts wanted to "'deceive and mislead the
public into believing"' that the CFL Colts were affiliated with the NFL Colts. Id.
23. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411. The injunction prevented the CFL team from using
the names "in connection with the playing of professional football, the broadcast of football
games, or the sale of merchandise to football fans and other buyers." Id. United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Larry J. McKinney granted the injunction on the grounds that "consumers of
'Baltimore CFL Colts' merchandise are likely to think, mistakenly, that the new Baltimore
team is an NFL team related in some fashion to the Indianapolis Colts..." Id. Judge McKin-
ney summarized by stating "[t]he mark Colts is clearly the property of the plaintiffs as a regis-
tered trademark. Clearly, the defendants cannot appropriate that mark to their own use." Jon
Morgan, Judge Sides With NFL on Colts, BALTIMOp SUN, June 28, 1994, at Al.
24. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416.
25. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INELLECrUAL PROPERTY 7-35 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
This required showing has been referred to as the "touchstone of trademark law." Id. (quot-
ing Little Caesar Enters. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 1987)).
1996]
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A. The "Likelihood of Confusion" Determination
Federal trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act.26 Sections
32(1)27 and 43(a) 28 of the Lanham Act are particularly important in
trademark infringement cases. 9 Section 32(1) provides for a civil cause
of action when a federally registered trademark has been infringed,3"
while section 43(a) protects against confusion as to the source, sponsor-
ship or association between the goods or services of economic
competitors.3 '
The central consideration in an infringement action brought under
either Section 32(1) or 43(a) of the Lanham Act is whether a "likelihood
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 and is named
after Texas Congressman Fritz Lanham. Curtis & Stempler, supra note 13, at 23 n.1. For a
discussion of how "[t]he Act both codifies and extends 'the common law principles of trade-
mark infringement,"' see Geise, supra note 16, at 556-58 (quoting Celeste Geier, Comment,
Protection of University Symbols, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 661, 666 (1986)).
27. Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertis-
ing of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
28. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin .... which
(a) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by an-
other person,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
29. Curtis & Stempler, supra note 13, at 24 (discussing protection afforded by Section
32(1) and 43(a) of Lanham Act).
30. EPsaEIN, supra note 25, at 309 (explaining requirements to be held liable under sec-
tion 32(1)).
31. Id. at 316.1-316.2 (stating section 43(a) gives broader protection to trademarks than
section 32(1) provides because it also protects trademarks not federally registered).
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of confusion" exists.32 "Likelihood of confusion" can be defined as the
probability that the accused infringer's mark is the legal cause, or cause
in fact, of confused, mistaken or deceived states of mind of potential
consumers.33 In other words, an inquiry into the "likelihood of confu-
sion" focuses on the product of the alleged infringer and asks whether
the public believes that the product originates from, or is somehow en-
dorsed or authorized by, the plaintiff.34
Courts have traditionally determined this "likelihood of confusion"
based on the application of a multi-factor test 5 Generally, these factors
include (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of similar-
ity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks; (3) the proximity
of the two products or services; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner
will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's good faith in
adopting the mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product or service;
and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.3 6 In addition to these tradi-
tional factors, courts have taken other considerations into account,3 7
such as the size of the plaintiff's investment, the expectations of the pub-
lic, the plaintiff's treatment of its own mark, the methods by which the
products are advertised, the geographical distribution of the products,
and the similarity in appearance of the products.3 8
32. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976)); AHP Subsidiary
Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1993); 3 J. THomAs McCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETITION § 23.01[1] (3d ed. 1992); Avi Fried-
man, Comment, Protection of Sports Trademarks, 15 Loy. L.A. Err. L.J. 689, 692 (1995).
33. RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW 1-2 to
1-4 (1995) (illustrating how phrase "likely to cause confusion" may be parsed).
34. Geise, supra note 16, at 560 (citing NFL Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982)).
35. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-7. "While '[t]here is no litmus rule which can pro-
vide a ready guide to all cases,' there is a generally accepted method of analyzing the likeli-
hood of confusion issue." Id. See McCA-RTHY, supra note 32, § 23.031l] (stating trademark
law has traditionally spelled out a list of foundational factors to be considered in determining
"likelihood of confusion"); Friedman, supra note 32, at 692 (stating Federal courts apply eight
factor test).
36. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 368
U.S. 820 (1961) (citing REsTATEmENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729-731 (1938)).
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 311-12 n.95 (listing other variables some courts take into
account); Friedman, supra note 32, at 692.
38. Friedman, supra note 32, at 692 (citing 1 JERowm GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECrION
AND PRACrnCE §§ 5.01-5.09 (1994)).
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The traditional factors that make up the multi-factor test were origi-
nally established in the Restatement (First) of Torts. 39 Eventually, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit)
formulated the traditional Restatement factors into a defined test.40 Fol-
lowing the Second Circuit's lead, each federal circuit adopted its own
version of the multi-factor test, based on the traditional factors.41 As a
result, each federal circuit has a "fountainhead" case and progeny setting
forth its variation of the multi-factor test.42
Recently, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its version of the multi-fac-
tor test 43 in Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enter.'4 The Nike court listed the
39. For a complete list of the foundational factors set out in the RE sTATEmNT (FIRsT) OF
ToRTs §§ 729-731 (1938), see KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-7 to 2-8; McCARTHY, supra
note 32, at § 23.03[1].
40. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-9 ("The
multiple factor analytical approach to likelihood of confusion received its prime judicial impe-
tus from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics
Corp."). "The Second Circuit was the first to formalize the 1938 Restatement criteria in some-
what different terminology in its famous 1961 Polaroid test, listing eight foundational factors
to be considered and weighed before the decision-maker comes to a conclusion about the
presence or absence of a likelihood of confusion." McCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24.06[41[a][i].
41. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-9 (suggesting multi-factor test is not contained in
any statute, but rather has been "refined, supplemented and applied" by each federal circuit);
McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 23.03[1] (stating multi-factor tests used by each federal circuit
based on same traditional factors).
42. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-9. For a complete list of the multi-factor test used in
each of the federal circuits, see id. at 2-9 to 2-14 (citing major cases laying out particular
circuit's test); see also McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 24.06[4][a] (describing multi-factor test
used by each federal circuit and citing major cases). However, it is important to note that:
[e]ach of the thirteen federal circuit courts of appeal has developed its own version of
the [multi-factor test] and each appears to be jealous of its own formulation of the
factors. The litigating attorney is well advised to focus upon the list used in a particular
circuit and not rely upon a list from a 'foreign' circuit.
kd § 24.06[4][a].
43. For earlier decisions laying out the Seventh Circuit's version of the multi-factor test,
see AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1993); Sands,
Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1179 (1993); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1990);
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075
(1990); Int'l Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988); McGraw-
Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1986); Piper Aircraft Corp.
v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1984); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight
Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978). See also KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 33, at 2-11 (listing factors Seventh Circuit uses in multi-factor test and citing rele-
vant cases); MCCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 24.06[4][a][viii] (describing Seventh Circuit's
multi-factor test).
44. 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993). In Nike, defendant "Just Did It" Enterprises was a
company owned and operated by a commercial artist named Michael Stanard. Id. at 1227.
Stanard created the company in an effort to market his first name, Mike, as a takeoff on the
[Vol. 7:39
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seven factors that the court is required to consider in determining
whether a "likelihood of confusion" exists:
(1) the degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and
suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products for which the name is
used; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of
care likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the
complainant's mark; (6) actual confusion; and (7) intent on the
part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of
another.45
The court stressed that a "likelihood of confusion" determination must
be the result of an analysis of the entire multi-factor test, rather than an
over-emphasis on any single factor.46  In stating that this list is not exclu-
sive, however, the Nike court indicated that other factors may also be
relevant.47 For example, the court suggested that the marketing chan-
nels used by the parties to the dispute may be an additional factor for
consideration.48
The Nike court determined that the plaintiff had shown that
certain factors indicated a "likelihood of confusion." 49 The court,
however, cautioned that no one factor was determinative in the
"likelihood of confusion" inquiry.5° Instead, the court pointed to
logos of Nike, Inc., a popular manufacturer of footwear, apparel and related accessories. Id.
at 1226-27. In what he termed as a "joke" and "personal pun," Stanard marketed t-shirts and
sweatshirts which displayed Nike's registered mark known as the "swoosh design" and the
word "Mike" underneath it instead of "Nike." Id. Nike, Inc. saw no humor in Stanard's
parody and sued for trademark infringement. Id. at 1226.
In Nike, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
plaintiff. Id. at 1233. The Nike court held that there were too many disputed facts on the
record to conclude, as a matter of law, that the defendant's alleged infringement would con-
fuse the public. Id. In reaching this decision, the Nike court stressed the importance of ana-
lyzing all of the factors that make up the multi-factor test. Id. at 1229-32 ("[W]e must analyze
several factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion.").
45. Id. at 1228 (citing McGraw-Edison, 787 F.2d at 1167-68; Helene Curtis, 560 F.2d at
1330).
46. Id. "[T]he court is required to consider several factors when assessing whether or not
there is a likelihood of confusion by the general public... This list [of factors] is not exclusive,
nor does any one factor end our inquiry." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 1228 (citing McGraw-Edison, 787 F.2d at 1168; Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628
F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980)).
48. Id. (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir.
1983); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt
Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979)).
49. Nike, 6 F.3d at 1232 (holding plaintiff's and defendant's marks involve similar prod-
ucts with similar uses, and this jeopardizes plaintiff's very strong mark).
50. Id. at 1228 (citing McGraw-Edison, 787 F.2d at 1168; Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091); see
also AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611,616 (7th Cir. 1993) ("None of
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its analysis of the entire multi-factor test which did not indicate
a clear-cut "likelihood of confusion. ' 51  As a result, the Nike
court reversed the district court's finding of a "likelihood of confu-
sio.52
The Seventh Circuit's multi-factor test is designed to protect consum-
ers against confusion or deceit when making purchases, and to protect
trademark owners by preventing others from reaping the benefits of the
creator's mark. 3 The Seventh Circuit, however, established a limit to
trademark protection in Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc.- In
the seven confusion factors alone is dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis."); Int'l
Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting none of factors
alone are dispositive of the "likelihood of confusion" question); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-
Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating Seventh Circuit reversed lower court
decisions that placed excessive reliance on certain factors).
51. Nike, 6 F.3d at 1232-33. The Nike court summarized its analysis of the factors which
did not necessarily indicate a "likelihood of confusion" by stating:
[c]ustomers purchase the [defendant's product] through the mail and must make the
check payable to JUST DID IT Enterprises. We have no idea if Nike employs similar
marketing. Stanard targeted a specific audience of consumers named Mike, who could
exercise enough care to tell the difference. The mailed letter and order blank empha-
size the "Mike" distinction. No identified customer has been confused by the prank,
and Stanard intended only to parody the Nike corporate image. Whether customers
would confuse MIKE and the swoosh design as affiliated with NIKE is a question of
fact over which reasonable minds may differ.
hi But cf. Mighty Star, 846 F.2d at 1087-91 (Seventh Circuit upheld lower court's finding of
"likelihood of confusion" after analyzing multi-factor test); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir. 1985) (Seventh Circuit upholds lower court's finding of
likelihood of confusion after analyzing factors as applied to facts of case), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1147 (1986).
52. Nike, 6 F.3d at 1233. The Nike court summarized its finding by stating:
Throughout its decision, the district court made several findings of fact, in the end
finding that [the defendant's product] likely confuses consumers. Although district
courts are expert in finding facts, at the summary judgment stage disputed facts must be
reserved for the jury. The court erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff,
and accordingly is reversed ...
Id.
53. Mark A. Robinson, Note, 4 SETON HAL J. SPORT L. 205, 209 (1994) (discussing his-
tory and purpose of federal trademark protection). The Seventh Circuit advanced another
rationale for trademark protection by asserting: "One of the reasons courts have given for
protecting trademark owners against the use of confusingly similar marks... is to protect the
owner's ability to enter product markets in which it does not now trade but into which it might
reasonably be expected to expand in the future." Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats
Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 464
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179 (1993)). See also Scandia Down, 772 F.2d at 1429-
30 (explaining benefits of trademark protection).
54. 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943). In Quaker Oats, the plaintiff, the Quaker Oats Co., filed
a complaint for a declaratory judgment claiming that it was entitled to use the mark "Oaties"
on a prepared breakfast cereal made of oat because the mark did not infringe on the defend-
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Quaker Oats, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision that
there was no "likelihood of confusion" between the parties' products.55
In summarizing its decision, the Quaker Oats court stated that "[a]nyone
deceived or confused by the plaintiff's package into believing he was get-
ting the defendant's package would be careless to a degree that the law
has no duty to protect. ' 56 Essentially, the court concluded that a manu-
facturer or provider who markets goods or services is not bound to make
them "foolproof," but rather to use reasonable means to prevent
confusion.57
B. Consumer Survey Evidence
In trademark disputes, the litigants often conduct consumer surveys
in an attempt to offer objective evidence of the public's perception con-
cerning the contested mark.58 As a result, survey evidence is generally
considered relevant to the traditional factor of "actual confusion." 59
ant's registered trademarks "Wheaties," "Kornies" or "Maizies." Id at 430. The defendant,
General Mills, Inc., filed a counterclaim seeking to enjoin the plaintiffs use of the mark, alleg-
ing that it infringed the defendant's registered trademarks. Id.
55. Id. at 432-33. The Quaker Oats court came to this determination after examining the
lower court's findings concerning similarity of the products, actual confusion (through use of
consumer surveys), intent and other factors. Id at 431-32.
56. Id. at 432. The Quaker Oats court further opined, "[o]ne would have to be stupid to
be misled or confused when confronted in a grocery store with the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's packages." Id
57. Id. at 432-33 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938); John
Morrel & Co. v. Doyle, 97 F.2d 232,237 (7th Cir. 1938)). See also Scandia Down, 772 F.2d at
1428 n.1 (rejecting Learned Hand's view that "likelihood of confusion" standard was "care-
less" rather than "ordinary" consumers and stating Seventh Circuit adheres to "ordinary pur-
chaser" standard).
58. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETrrIoN
§ 32.46 (3d ed. 1992). "[A] ... scientific means of evidencing mental associations is to intro-
duce the actual responses of a group of people who are typical of the target group whose
perceptions are at issue in a case. Survey evidence is often introduced for this purpose ... "
Id See also Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation,
19 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 471, 473 (1989) (claiming favorable results from competent survey
increase probability that court will find likelihood of confusion); Jack P. Lipton, Trademark
Litigation: A New Look at the Use of Social Science Evidence, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 639, 641
(1987) ("In the trademark area, social science surveys, generally pertaining to the state of
mind of prospective purchasers, have been offered as evidence of the existence of... con-
sumer confusion.").
59. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 7-32 to 7-33. See also McCARTHY, supra note 58, at
§ 32.54[1][a] (evaluating whether consumer survey data is evidence of "actual confusion").
"Several courts, when assembling the evidence within a likelihood of confusion framework of
factors such as the Polaroid Eight, have put survey evidence under the heading of 'actual
confusion."' Id. (footnote omitted).
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Whether this characterization is proper has been the subject of much
debate.60
The controversy concerns the appropriate weight that should be
given to a consumer survey.61 Pertinent to this consideration, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States recommends that the offeror of any
survey has the burden of establishing that:
(1) the proper universe was selected and examined; (2) a repre-
sentative sample was drawn from that universe; (3) the mode of
questioning the interviewees was correct; (4) the persons con-
ducting the survey were recognized experts; (5) the data gthered
were accurately reported; (6) the sample design, the question-
naire and the interviewing were in accordance with generally ac-
cepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field
of such surveys; (7) the sample design and the interviews were
conducted independently of the attorneys; and (8) the interview-
ers trained in this field had no knowledge of the litigation or the
purposes for which the survey was used.62
A consumer survey, therefore, should be given weight only to the extent
that it replicates the real world setting, from which instances of "actual
confusion" can be observed.63
Traditionally, the Seventh Circuit has accepted legitimate consumer
surveys as evidence of actual confusion.6a Before accepting this evi-
60. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 7-33 to 7-34 (citing Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey
Evidence in Trademark Litigation: Science, Art or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP.
71, 80-81 (1990)).
61. Id. at 7-34. "Survey evidence is, to say the least, 'often controversial, if only because
there are so many factors to be considered in determining the weight to be given to this type
of evidence."' Id. (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1334 (T.T.A.B. 1992)).
62. NFL Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 657 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) (citing Judicial Conference of the United States, Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 429 (1960)); see also KIRKPAT-
RICK, supra note 33, at 7-34 (listing similar factors used in determining "trustworthiness" of
survey).
63. McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 23.02[2][e] (citing Harvey S. Perlman, The Restate-
ment of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in Progress, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 461, 472
(1990)).
64. AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1992) (survey
evidence correct methodology for assessing consumer confusion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179
(1993); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1171-73 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Seventh Circuit reversed district court's rejection of survey evidence offered to show actual
confusion).
In Stuart Hale, the plaintiff owned the federally registered trademark to "PAM," a non-
stick cooking spray. Id. at 612. The defendant applied for federal trademark registration for
"Pan-lite," also a nonstick cooking spray. Id. at 613. In response to the defendant's trade-
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dence, the Seventh Circuit typically will review the administration of the
survey to see that it meets factors similar to those suggested by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. 65 A consumer survey containing
some flaws will not be instantly dismissed, but the weight given to the
survey will be affected accordingly. 6 In contrast, a consumer survey
mark application, the plaintiff brought a federal trademark infringement action. Id. Follow-
ing an evidentiary hearing, the district court excluded the plaintiff's consumer survey and
granted a summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 614-15.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
Id. at 620. The district court had excluded the plaintiff's survey because it had not gathered
data concerning real-world incidents of actual confusion. Id. at 618. In reversing this portion
of the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that consumer surveys were ac-
ceptable as evidence indicating actual confusion. Id. As a result, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that "in the present case, we believe that the district court was premature in rejecting
the survey evidence proffered by [the plaintiff]." Id.
65. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366,388 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976). In Union Carbide, the plaintiff, Union Carbide, Inc., sold an extensive line of
electric batteries, flashlights, and miniature bulbs under the its trademark "EVEREADY."
Id at 370. The defendant, Ever-Ready, Inc., began importing miniature lamp bulbs having the
term "Ever-Ready" stamped on their bases and selling these bulbs in packages marked with
the term "Ever-Ready" in a four-sided logo. Id at 371. In addition, the defendant also im-
ported high-intensity lamps with the term "Ever-Ready" stamped on them or on labels at-
tached to them. Id. The plaintiff brought a federal trademark infringement action seeking an
injunction against the defendant's use of the term "Ever-Ready." Id. In preparation for trial,
the plaintiff conducted two consumer surveys. Id. at 385. However, the district court found
that the surveys "were entitled to little, if any, -weight." Id. at 386 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in not crediting the
surveys taken by the plaintiff. Id. at 387. In making this decision, the Seventh Circuit ex-
amined the factors relevant to the taking of a consumer survey, including: (1) the proper
universe was selected and examined; (2) a representative sample was drawn from that uni-
verse; (3) the mode of questioning the interviewees was correct; (4) the persons conducting
the surveys were recognized experts; (5) the data gathered was accurately reported; and (6)
the sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were in accordance with the gener-
ally accepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys. Id. at
387-88. For a full list of the factors recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United
States concerning the proper administration of a consumer survey, see supra note 62 and ac-
companying text.
66. Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1983). In Kraft,
the plaintiff, Henri's Food Products, developed and marketed a spoonable salad dressing
made with yogurt named "YOGOWHIP." Id. at 354. At the same time, the defendant, Kraft,
Inc., had already been marketing a spoonable salad dressing named "MIRACLE WHIP." Id.
After filing a federal registration for the trademark "YOGOWHIP" for its salad dressing, the
plaintiff brought an action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the trademark
did not infringe the defendant's registered trademark "MIRACLE WHIP." Id. at 353-54. The
district court granted the plaintiff a declaratory judgment, from which the defendant appealed.
Id. at 353.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the consumer survey conducted for the plaintiff was
flawed concerning the site of the survey, the products shown to interviewees, the manner of
displaying these products and the questions asked. Id. at 356-57. According to the defendant,
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containing substantial deficiencies will be rejected.67 Consequently, the
Seventh Circuit has given deference to consumer surveys only to the ex-
tent that they evidence actual confusion. In the context of Indianapolis
Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd.,' it is important
to emphasize that "actual confusion" is only one of the seven factors
used in the "likelihood of confusion" determination.69
C. Trademark Abandonment
In federal trademark infringement actions, the defendant charged
with infringement may raise the affirmative defense that the plaintiff has
these flaws required the district court to exclude the survey. Id. The Seventh Circuit con-
ceded that the defendant's challenges to the consumer survey had merit. Id. at 357. After
addressing each one, however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not err
in admitting the survey, in spite of its flaws. Id. at 359. See also Stuart Hale, 1 F.3d at 618
("We believe that any shortcomings in the survey results go to the proper weight of the survey
and should be evaluated by the trier of fact."); McGraw-Edison, 787 F.2d at 1172-73 (holding
problems with method of conducting survey went to weight not evidence admissibility); KIRK-
PATRICK, supra note 33, at 7-34 ("Unless the survey is seriously flawed, alleged technical or
methodological deficiencies generally affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.")
(citation omitted).
67. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992). In Delavan, the
plaintiff, Spraying Systems, manufactured and sold "spray nozzles and related equipment for
use in industrial and agricultural markets." Id. at 389. The plaintiff manufactured and sold
these items under a number of valid federal trademarks containing the suffix "-JET." Id. The
defendant, Delavan, Inc., owned two trademark registrations for "COLOR JET," a name
used by the defendant "in connection with spray nozzles designed primarily for agricultural
applications." Id. at 390. The plaintiff sued the defendant for federal trademark infringement,
and for the cancellation of the defendant's two federal trademark registrations. Id. at 389.
The United States "Trademark Trial and Appeal Board granted summary judgment in favor of
[the defendant], finding no genuine issue of confusing similarity between the defendant's
COLOR JET mark and [the plaintiff's] several marks" ending in "-JET." Id. Pursuant to
section 21(b) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff sought review of the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board's decision in the district court. Id. at 390. The district court, after reviewing the
Board's decision and considering new evidence, again found no genuine issue of material fact
concerning confusion and granted the defendant summary judgment. Id.
From this decision, the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 391. One of the plaintiff's bases for ap-
peal was the claim that the district court improperly rejected the plaintiff's consumer survey.
Id. at 393. The Seventh Circuit analyzed the plaintiff's survey and found major problems
including: the biased nature of the survey's questions, the fact that the survey was conducted
over the telephone rather than visually, and the low percentage of respondents that indicated
they were confused. Id. at 394. These majors flaws led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that
the district court's exclusion of the survey was proper. Id.
68. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
69. Smart Hale, 1 F.3d at 618 (citing Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063,
1070 (7th Cir. 1992); McGraw-Edison, 787 F.2d at 1172-73)). "[T]his circuit has repeatedly
stated that... actual confusion is only one element of the [multi-factor] test." Id.
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abandoned the contested mark.7" The Lanham Act defines abandon-
ment as non-use of a mark with an intent not to resume such use.71 If a
mark is indeed abandoned, it returns to the public domain and may be
seized immediately by a subsequent user.72
The Seventh Circuit analyzes the defense of abandonment under the
Lanham Act standard.73 This analysis focuses on the two prongs of the
Lanham Act abandonment standard.74 The first prong, "nonuse," has
70. 2 J. THoMAs McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 17.01[4] (3d ed. 1992) (describing possible legal situations where alleged abandonment may
become significant issue).
71. The Lanham Act states in pertinent part:
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" when either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not
to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years shall
be prima facie evidence of abandonment. 'Use' of a mark means the bona fide use of
that mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a
mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as
commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on
or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). This section of the Lanham Act not only defines abandonment for
trademarks and litigation covered by federal law, it also creates a presumption of abandon-
ment. McCARTHY, supra note 70, at § 17.06.
72. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, at § 17.01[2] (citing Sutton Cosmetics (P.R1), Inc. v.
Lander Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. 461 (S.D.NY. 1971), affd, 455 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972)).
73. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 954-55 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1179 (1993).
Because trademark rights derive from the use of a mark in commerce and not from
mere registration of the mark, the owner of a mark will lose his exclusive rights if he
fails actually to use it... A mark is deemed to be thus "abandoned" when its use has
been discontinued with intent not to resume such use... T'vo years of nonuse create a
prima facie case of abandonment, which may be rebutted by "evidence explaining the
nonuse or demonstrating the lack of an intent not to resume use."
Id. (citing Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1075 (1990)). For the applicable provision of Lanham Act concerning trademark abandon-
ment, see supra note 71.
74. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 955-56. In Sands, Taylor & Wood, the plaintiff,
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. (STW), purchased a corporation, Joseph Middleby, Jr., Inc. (Mid-
dleby), in 1973 and thereby became the owner of three trademarks registered to Middleby.
Id. at 949. These trademarks included: (1) "THIRST-AID 'First Aid For Your Thirst,"' issued
in 1950 for use on non-alcoholic beverages sold as softdrinks, and the syrups used therein; (2)
"THIRST-AID," issued in 1952 for use on various ice-cream toppings; and (3) "THIRST-
AID," issued in 1953 for use on soda fountain syrups used to make maltless soft drinks. Id.
From 1921 to 1973, the original owner of the marks, Middleby, had used the marks "on a wide
variety of beverage products and syrups." Id. The plaintiff continued this use until 1980. Id.
at 950. In 1980, the plaintiff granted Pet, Inc. a nationwide license to use the mark "THIRST-
AID" on an isotonic beverage designed to compete with the very popular "Gatorade" brand
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traditionally been a simple determination for the Seventh Circuit.7' Sim-
ilarly, the Seventh Circuit uses a clearly defined evaluation for the sec-
ond prong of the Lanham Act standard, "intent not to resume use."76
Once a trademark is abandoned under the Lanham Act standard, how-
isotonic beverage. Id. However, following five months of test-marketing in Columbia, South
Carolina, this venture was not pursued. Id.
Thereafter, STW assigned to L.Karp & Sons (Karp) all of the registered "THIRST-AID"
marks, yet simultaneously obtained an exclusive license back for the use of the marks on
bakery supplies. Id. In 1983, the defendant, Quaker Oats, Co., purchased the company that
manufactured "Gatorade." Id. Following this purchase, Quaker Oats initiated a new advertis-
ing campaign for "Gatorade" and selected the slogan: "Gatorade is Thirst Aid for That Deep
Down Body Thirst." Id. After this advertising campaign was launched, the plaintiff filed suit
alleging that the defendant's use of the new slogan constituted trademark infringement. Id. at
951. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had abandoned the "THIRST-AID" mark by not
using it for a beverage sold at retail. Id. at 955. The district court found that there was no
abandonment. Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's finding that the plaintiff had
not abandoned the mark. In its review of the district court's finding, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed both prongs of the Lanham Act abandonment standard, "non-use" and "intent not
to resume use," and concluded that the plaintiff did not abandon the right to use the mark. Id.
at 955-56.
75. Id. at 955. "So long as the owner [of a trademark) continues use of the 'key element'
of the registered mark, courts generally will not find abandonment." Id. (citing McCARTH,
supra note 70, at § 17.10[2]).
76. Roulo, 886 F.2d at 938. The Seventh Circuit addressed the confusion in other federal
circuits surrounding the required showing under this prong of the Lanham Act abandonment
standard by stating:
Some courts require the owner of the trade[mark] not used for over two years to
demonstrate the intent to resume use. Other courts require the owner to prove the
presumably lesser showing of the absence of an intent to abandon. We think the
proper approach is to require evidence to demonstrate the intent not to resume use.
This reading comports with the language of the statute and the seeming intent of Con-
gress to prevent hoarding of trademarks where the owner has no intent to abandon,
although no intent to resume use of the trademark within the reasonably foreseeable
future.
Id. (citations omitted). In Roulo, the plaintiff, Georgia Lee Miller Roulo, had developed a
line of greeting cards known as "Feeling Sensitive" (FS) cards. Id. at 934. The plaintiff and
the defendant, Russ Berrie & Co., Inc. (Berrie), had entered into a two-year agreement
whereby the "defendant would exclusively manufacture, distribute and sell FS cards," while
the plaintiff would receive a percentage of the sales receipts and would also retain ownership
of the trademark rights. Id. When the two-year agreement expired, the plaintiff did not wish
to renew it, prompting the defendant to develop "a comparable greeting card line." Id.
The plaintiff brought suit for infringement of her FS line under the Lanham Act. Id. at
934-35. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
Id. at 935. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that it was within the jury's prerogative to
credit the plaintiff's testimony concerning her intent to resume use, therefore signalling no
abandonment. Id. at 939.
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ever, it returns to the "public domain," where it may be utilized by a
subsequent user.77
The effect of abandonment on a trademark was recently addressed
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Dena-
rius, Ltd.78 In Sed Non, the district court rejected the plaintif's argu-
ment that its mark "Dodgers," standing alone without a geographical
reference, was infringed by the defendant's actions.79 While rejecting
this argument, the court stressed that the plaintiff had abandoned the
mark "Brooklyn Dodgers" when it changed the name of its team to "Los
Angeles Dodgers."8' 0
77. Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C. & C. Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Bellanca Aircraft Corp. v. Bellanca Aircraft Eng'g,
Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 158, 168 (T.T.A.B. 1976)). In Dovenmuehle, the plaintiffs were members of
the Dovenmuehle family, who owned Dovenmuehle, Inc. Id. at 698. In 1969, the members of
the Dovenmuehle family sold all of their interest in Dovenmuehle, Inc. Id. Following several
transactions involving the company's assets, a corporation named Gilldom Mortgage Midwest
Corporation (Gilldorn) concluded that it owned the rights to the trade name "Dovenmuehle,
Inc." Id. As a result, Gilldorn elected to change its name to "Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc."
Id. After learning of this plan, the plaintiffs brought suit. Id. In the suit, the plaintiffs claimed
that the "Dovenmuehle" trade name was abandoned after a long period of non-use, and
therefore reverted back to them. Id. at 701. However, the Seventh Circuit held that abandon-
ment results in the trademark's return to the public domain, rather than in reversion to its
previous owners. Id. See also McCARTHY, supra note 70, at § 17.01[1] ("Once held aban-
doned, a mark falls into the public domain and is free for all to use.").
78. 817 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated pursuant to settlement, 859 F. Supp. 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Sed Non, one of the plaintiffs was the Los Angeles Dodgers, a profes-
sional baseball team playing in Los Angeles, California since 1958. Id. at 1109-10. Before
1958, the Los Angeles Dodgers had played in Brooklyn, New York and been known as the
"Brooklyn Dodgers." Id. at 1110. Joining the Los Angeles Dodgers in the suit was Major
League Baseball Properties (MLBP) who, by agreement with the Major League professional
baseball teams, had "been granted the exclusive right to market, license, publish, publicize,
promote nationally, and protect the trademarks owned by the [teams], including those owned
by the Los Angeles Dodgers." Id. The plaintiffs brought a trademark infringement action
against three corporations, as well as their owners individually, stemming from the defend-
ant's use of the words "The Brooklyn Dodger" as the name and mark of a bar/restaurant in
Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 1108.
79. Id. at 1128. The plaintiff argued, unsuccessfully, that they had a protected use in the
mark "Dodgers" by itself, not just "Los Angeles Dodgers," and therefore by naming their
restaurant "The Brooklyn Dodger," the defendants infringed this protected use. Id.
80. Id. at 1127-28. The Sed Non court found that the plaintiff had abandoned the mark
"Brooklyn Dodgers" by noting that the plaintiff made no commercial use of the mark for over
twenty years, thereby satisfying both the "non-use" requirement, and the "intent not to re-
sume such use" requirement for abandonment under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1126-31 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)).
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The Sed Non court concluded that the word "Brooklyn" was more
than a geographic designation or appendage to the word "Dodgers."81
Hence, the court found that the "Brooklyn Dodgers" was a non-trans-
portable cultural institution separate from the plaintiff, a professional
baseball team named the "Dodgers" that had moved to Los Angeles.'
Because the plaintiff abandoned this cultural institution by moving its
team to Los Angeles, the Sed Non court concluded that the defendant's
use of the mark "Brooklyn Dodger" was not an infringement of the
plaintiff's mark.8 3
IV. NARRATIrE ANALYSIS
In Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club,
Ltd.,84 the Seventh Circuit upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion in a federal trademark infringement action. 5 In its decision, the
court indicated that the trademark dispute required a "likelihood of con-
fusion" determination.86 As discussed above, this determination is usu-
ally made through the application of a multi-factor test.8 7 However, in
this case, the court only mentioned a few of the factors that make up the
multi-factor test.88 Further, the court never actually analyzed any of
81. Id. at 1128.
82. Id. The Sed Non court pointed out that "[i]t is not simply the 'Dodgers,' (and cer-
tainly not the 'Los Angeles Dodgers'), that defendants seek to invoke in their restaurant;
rather defendants specifically seek to recall the nostalgia of the cultural institution that was
the 'Brooklyn Dodgers."' Id.
83. Sed Non, 817 F. Supp. at 1134. The Sed Non court summarized its findings by stating:
This court holds that plaintiffs' failure to utilize the 'Brooklyn Dodgers' mark for any
significant, commercial trademark use between 1958 and 1981 constituted an abandon-
ment of that mark...
Accordingly, the court declines to enjoin defendants' very limited use of the 'Brooklyn
Dodger' mark by defendants for use in connection with its local restaurants directed
toward older Brooklyn Dodgers fans in the Brooklyn community in the City of New
York.
Id (citation omitted).
84. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
85. The plaintiff, the Indianapolis Colts (along with the NFL and NFL Properties), is a
professional football team located in Indianapolis, Indiana. The defendant, Metropolitan Bal-
timore Football Club Ltd. (along with the CFL), owns the CFL's expansion team in Baltimore,
Maryland. In the suit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed its trademark,
"Indianapolis Colts," by choosing the name "Baltimore CFL Colts" for the expansion team.
Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 414.
87. For a full discussion of the Seventh Circuit's traditional approach in applying the
multi-factor test, see supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
88. For a description of the Seventh Circuit's cursory review of the multi-factor test used
in this "likelihood of confusion" determination, see infra note 99-101 and accompanying text.
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those factors as they applied to the facts of the case.89 Instead, this deci-
sion was based almost exclusively on the consumer survey evidence sub-
mitted to the lower court.90 At the same time, the court disregarded the
district judge's finding that the trademark at issue had been
abandoned.91
The court began its decision by describing the factual history sur-
rounding the case to "frame" the dispute.92 Next, the court dispensed
with the issues of jurisdiction and venue.93
The court prefaced its treatment of the "likelihood of confusion" is-
sue by examining whether confusion was possible between the plaintiff's
mark and the defendant's mark.94 First, the court found that there was
an institutional continuity of the plaintiff, the Indianapolis Colts, from
the time before they moved out of Baltimore until the time of the suit.95
Next, the court stated that if all parties understood that there was no link
between the "institutionally continuous" Indianapolis Colts and the de-
89. Geise, supra note 16, at 570. The lower court had ostensibly utilized the Seventh
Circuit's version of the multi-factor test to determine that a "likelihood of confusion" existed.
Id. "Ironically, the [lower] court supported this decision with little discussion of the seven
factors as applied to the facts." Id.
90. For a description of the court's reliance on consumer survey evidence, see infra notes
102-09 and accompanying text.
91. For a full discussion of the court's treatment of the abandonment issue, see infra notes
110-26 and accompanying text.
92. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411. For a full discussion of the factual background
surrounding the litigation, see supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
93. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411-12. The court held that the Indiana longarm statute
reached the defendant in Maryland. Id. The longarm statute reached the defendant because
the defendant chose the name "Baltimore CFL Colts," which might be found to be confus-
ingly similar to that of the Indianapolis Colts, and therefore assumed the risk of injuring valu-
able property located in Indiana. Id. Alternatively, the court suggested that the defendant's
intended broadcast of games in Indiana constituted "entering" the state because the majority
of people who are likely to be confused are Indianapolis Colts fans located in Indiana. Id.
The court handled the issue of venue simply by stating "[i]t is as clear or clearer that venue is
proper in Indiana." Id. at 412 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2) and McCARTHY, supra note 58,
at § 32.22(3)(b)(iii)).
94. Id. at 413-14.
95. Id. at 413-14. The court explained this notion of institutional continuity by stating:
When Mr. Irsay transported his team, the Baltimore Colts, from Baltimore to Indian-
apolis in one night in 1984, the team remained, for a time anyway, completely intact:
same players, same coaches, same front-office personnel. With the passage of time, of
course, the team changed. Players retired or were traded, and were replaced. Coaches
and other nonplaying personnel came and went. But as far as the record discloses
there is as much institutional continuity between the Baltimore Colts of 1984 and the
Indianapolis Colts of 1994 as there was between the Baltimore Colts of 1974 and the
Baltimore Colts of 1984.
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fendant, then there would be no injury whereby the Lanham Act would
provide a remedy.96 Finally, the court stated, "[i]f not everyone knows
[of the distinction], there is harm."97 Based on this analysis, the court
determined that some people might believe that there is no affiliation
between the Indianapolis Colts and the CFL's new Baltimore team;
therefore, confusion is possible.98
The court followed this conclusion with the rationale that the possi-
bility of confusion between the plaintiff and the defendant required a
determination of a "likelihood of confusion" between the two.9 9 Ac-
cording to the court, the legal standard for making such a determination
under the Lanham Act, is "whether it is likely that the challenged mark
if permitted to be used by the defendant would cause the plaintiff to lose
a substantial number of consumers."' The court listed several factors
pertinent to this determination, including "the similarity of the marks
and of the parties' products, the knowledge of the average consumer of
96. Id. at 414. The court explained this idea by suggesting that everyone would have to
know that there was "no continuity, no links contractual or otherwise, nothing but a geograph-
ical site in common" between the plaintiff, who was previously located in Baltimore, and the
defendant. Id.
97. Id. The court offered examples of the potential harm that might be suffered:
Some people who might otherwise watch the Indianapolis Colts (or some other NFL
team, for remember that the NFL, representing all the teams, is a coplaintiff [sic]) on
television may watch the Baltimore CFL Colts instead, thinking they are the "real"
Baltimore Colts, and the NFL will lose revenue. A few (doubtless very few) people
who might otherwise buy tickets to an NFL game may buy tickets to a Baltimore CFL
Colts game instead. Some people who might otherwise buy merchandise stamped with
the name "Indianapolis Colts" or the name of some other NFL team may buy mer-
chandise stamped "Baltimore CFL Colts," thinking it a kin of the NFL's Baltimore
Colts in the glory days of Jonny Unitas rather than a newly formed team that plays
Canadian football in a Canadian football league.
Id.
98. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 414. The court referred to these uninformed people,
who would not be warned off as to the real identity of the CFL's Baltimore team, as "football
illiterates." Id. at 412.
99. Id. at 414. The court expressed its concern about how wide the "likelihood of confu-
sion" determination should extend. Id. The court stated "[t]here is great variance in con-
sumer competence, and it would be undesirable to impoverish the lexicon of trade names
merely to protect the most gullible fringe of the consuming public. The Lanham Act does not
cast the net of protection so wide." Id. (citing Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d
1423, 1428 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986); Quaker Oats Co. v. General
Mills Co., 134 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1943); McCARTHY, supra note 32, at §23.27[4]).
100. Id. at 414. The court recognized that the legal standard for determining whether
there is a "likelihood of confusion" under the Lanham Act has been given different formula-
tions by the different circuits, but summarized that the different formulations all reduce to the
same basic premise. Id. For a discussion of the formulations used by the different circuits, see
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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the product, [and] the overlap in the parties' geographical markets
"101
Rather than plunging into an examination of the pertinent factors,
the court instead turned to the consumer survey evidence that had been
submitted at trial.'02 The court began its discussion by stating that "the
parties to trademark disputes frequently as here hire professionals in
marketing or applied statistics to conduct surveys of consumers." 10 3
Before examining the specific surveys, the court expressed an overall
dissatisfaction with the system by which consumer survey experts are re-
tained, as well as quality control measures that are exercised over
them. o4
Both parties submitted consumer survey studies, but the court
gave little weight to the defendant's study, finding it to be lacking in
its methodology. 0 The court, however, did find the plaintiff's
study thorough and professional. 0 6  Although the court expressed
101. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 414. This list contains only four of the seven factors
used by the Seventh Circuit in making a "likelihood of confusion" determination. The court
alludes to the other three in a vague statement about "other factors" that previous cases have
considered. Id. For a complete list of the factors used by the Seventh Circuit in making a
"likelihood of confusion" determination, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 414-16. For a discussion of the lower court's finding of "likelihood of confu-
sion" without application of multiple-factor test, see supra note 89.
103. Id. at 414 (citing McCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 32.55[2]; Jones, supra note 58; Lip-
ton, supra note 58).
104. Id. at 415. This dissatisfaction was crystallized in the court's statement that "both
experts in this case were hired and, we have no doubt, generously renumerated even though
both have been criticized in previous judicial opinions." Id.
105. Id. The court described the defendants' study by stating:
The defendants' [study] was prepared by Michael Rappeport and is summarized in a
perfunctory affidavit by Dr. Rappeport to which the district judge gave little weight.
That was a kindness. The heart of Rappeport's study was a survey that consisted of
three loaded questions asked in one Baltimore mall. Rappeport has been criticized
before for his methodology, and we hope that he will take these criticisms to heart in
his next courtroom appearance.
Id. (citation omitted).
106. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415. The court stated that "[t]he plaintiff's study, con-
ducted by Jacob Jacoby, was far more substantial and the district judge found it on the whole
credible. The 28-page report with its numerous appendices has all the trappings of social
scientific rigor." Id. When administering the survey:
[i]nterviewers showed several hundred consumers in 24 malls scattered around the
country, shirts and hats licensed by the defendant for sale to consumers. The shirts and
hats had "Baltimore CFL Colts" stamped on them. The consumers were asked
whether they were football fans, whether they watched football games on television,
and whether they ever bought merchandise with a team name on it. Then they were
asked, with reference to the "Baltimore CFL Colts" merchandise that they were
shown, such questions as whether they knew what sport the team played, what teams it
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some concern about the questions asked by the plaintiff's survey, and
the selectiveness of the subsample, 10 7 it ultimately agreed with
the plaintiff that the survey indicated "astonishing levels of confu-
sion.,1o8
As a result, the court upheld the finding of a "likelihood of confu-
sion," because it could find no clear error on the part of the district judge
"in crediting the major findings of the [plaintiff's] study and infen-ing
from it... that the defendants' use of the name 'Baltimore CFL Colts'
... was likely to confuse a substantial number of consumers."'0 9
The Seventh Circuit gave little weight to the district court's finding
that the plaintiff had abandoned the trademark "Baltimore Colts" after
moving to Indianapolis." 0 The defendant argued that the Indianapolis
Colts' abandonment of the trademark "Baltimore Colts" allowed the de-
fendant to appropriate the mark."' The court rejected this argument,
however, through a discussion of the effect of trademark abandonment,
both in theory and in practice."12
The court conceded that, in theory, when a trademark is abandoned,
it returns to the public domain and may be adopted by a new user." 3 In
practice, however, the court insisted that "because 'subsequent use of
played against, what league the team was in, and whether the team or league needed
someone's permission to use this name, and if so whose.
il
107. The court agreed with the defendant's protest that: (1) plaintiff's choice of the name
"Baltimore Horses" for a second comparison survey "loaded the dice" somewhat; and (2) that
some of the Plaintiff's questions were "a bit slanted." Id. at 415-16. Additionally, the court felt
that it was "unfortunate" and "a bit tricky" that a more selective subsample was not selected.
Id. at 416. As well, the court expressed its belief that "no doubt there are other tricks of the
survey researcher's black arts that we have missed." Id. Finally, according to the court,
"[t]here is the more fundamental problem, one common to almost all consumer survey re-
search, that people are more careful when they are laying out their money than when they are
answering questions." Id.
108. Id. The court highlighted the results of the survey which suggested that an over-
whelming majority of "self-identified" football fans were confused as to who the Baltimore
CFL Colts were, and whether they were somehow sponsored or authorized by the Indianapo-
lis Colts or the NFL. Id.
109. Id. According to the court, this finding required that the injunction be issued. Id.
110. Id. at 412-13. The court treats the district judge's finding as an obvious fact by stating
"[w]ell of course; (the Indianapolis Colts] were no longer playing football under the name
'Baltimore Colts,' so [they] could not have used the name as the team's trademark." Id. at
412.
111. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412-13. For a full discussion of the Indianapolis Colts'
abandonment of the mark "Baltimore Colts," see infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 412-13. For a full discussion of the Seventh Circuit's traditional approach to
issue of abandonment, see supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 412.
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[an] abandoned mark may well evoke a continuing association with the
prior use, those who make subsequent use may be required to take rea-
sonable precautions to prevent confusion.' "114 The court found this pre-
cept particularly important because this case involved a situation where
the former owner of the abandoned mark, the Indianapolis Colts, contin-
ued to market the same product or service, professional football, under a
similar name." 5 As far as the court was concerned, the fact that the
plaintiff abandoned the trademark "Baltimore Colts" in order to select a
very similar one did not allow the defendant to use the abandoned trade-
mark to confuse potential consumers. 1 6
The court also gave very little weight to the defendant's inclusion of
the acronym "CFL" in the team name. 17 The court assumed that the
inclusion was an attempt to improve the defendant's litigating posture
rather than view it as a "reasonable precaution to prevent confusion"
under the abandonment standard."' Even if viewed as a reasonable
precaution, the court still felt that the maneuver did little to dispel the
confusion that might be created in "football illiterates."" 9 As a result,
the court viewed the acronym as a "red herring," that was not to distract
from the real issue of whether the defendant could use the name "Balti-
more Colts."' 2 °
Similarly, the court rejected the defendant's abandonment argument
based on Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Dena-
rius, Ltd., 2' a case from the United States District Court for the South-
114. Id. at 412-13 (alteration in original) (quoting McCARTY, supra note 70, at
§ 17.01[2)).
115. Id. at 413. However, the court did note that it could not "find any previous cases of
this kind." Id.
116. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 413. The court expressed its concern that this confu-
sion might be felt not only by Indianapolis Colts fans, but also by "other actual or potential
consumers of products and services marketed by the [Indianapolis] Colts or by other National
Football League teams, with regard to the identity, sponsorship, or league affiliation of the
third party, that is, the new Baltimore team." Id.
117. Id. at 412. The court suggests that this inclusion was a concession readily given to an
outraged NFL because the acronym appears in small or blurred letters on several items. Id.
118. Id. The court offered no explanation for its theory that the inclusion of the acronym
"CFL" was done to better the defendant's litigating posture.
119. Id. The court suggested that the acronym "CFU' has none of the instant recognition
value of the acronym "NFL." Id. Essentially, the court worried that those who "know" foot-
ball would know the difference between the two professional leagues, but those who did not
know football would "not be warned off by the letters 'CFL.'" Id.
120. Id.
121. 817 F. Supp. 1103,1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated pursuant to settlement, 859 F. Supp.
80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). For a full discussion of the facts of Sed Non, see supra notes 78-83 and
accompanying text.
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ern District of New York.1' The defendant pointed to the finding in Sed
Non that a team can be deemed a "nontransportable cultural institution"
separate from the identity that the team assumes upon moving to an-
other city.123 Therefore, the defendant contended that the "sudden and
greatly resented departure of the Baltimore Colts for Indianapolis made
the name 'Baltimore Colts' available to anyone who would continue the
'nontransportable cultural institution' constituted by a football team in
the City of Baltimore."'124 The court distinguished Sed Non by pointing
to the fact that it involved the name of a restaurant, not a professional
team.' 25 There was no possibility of confusion between a restaurant and
a professional team in Sed Non, declared the court, whereas in this case
there is the possibility of confusion between two professional teams play-
ing the same sport. 126
V. CRrrICAL ANALYsIs
A. Likelihood of Confusion
The generally accepted method of analyzing a trademark dispute
under the Lanham Act consists of applying a multi-factor test to the facts
of a particular case to determine whether there is a "likelihood of confu-
sion."' 27 In Indianapolis Colts, the court noted certain factors tradition-
ally used in the Seventh Circuit for this analysis, yet the court never
discussed their application to the facts of the case.1' 8 Instead of utilizing
the multi-factor test, the court relied almost exclusively on the results of
the consumer survey evidence after voicing serious doubts about the
consumer survey system in general and the parties' surveys in particu-
122. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 413. The court showed its disapproval of this argument
by stating, "1[w]e... need not even try to distinguish Sed Non OletDenarius since district court
decisions are not authoritative in this or any court of appeals." Id.
123. Id. In Sed Non, the "Brooklyn Dodgers" were found to be a "nontransportable cul-
tural institution" separate from the "Los Angeles Dodgers," the identity the team assumed
when it moved from Brooklyn, New York to Los Angeles, California. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court did address some final arguments raised by the defendant, but dis-
missed them as either baffling or without merit. Id. at 416.
127. KIRKPATRicK, supra note 33, at 2-7. For a full discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
traditional approach using the "multi-factor test," see supra notes 43-57 and accompanying
text.
128. Geise, supra note 16, at 570. For a discussion of the lower court's finding of a "likeli-
hood of confusion" without apparent application of the multi-factor test, see supra note .9.
For a complete list of the seven factors used by the Seventh Circuit in a "likelihood of confu-
sion" analysis, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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lar. 2 9 Finally, the court disregarded the district judge's finding that the
plaintiff had abandoned the trademark "Baltimore Colts," despite the
fact that the Lanham Act specifically provides that abandonment is a
valid defense in a trademark infringement action. 3 °
A full exploration of the seven factors used by the Seventh Circuit in
a "likelihood of confusion" analysis is not a mechanical process. 131
Rather, the proper approach is to weigh each factor in the context of the
others to determine if, on balance, a likelihood of confusion exists.' 32 A
full exploration of the factors, as applied to the facts of this case, seems
to suggest that the court should have reversed the district court's finding
of a likelihood of confusion.' 33
129. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415-16. For a full discussion of why the court largely
accepted the plaintiff's survey over the defendant's survey, see supra notes 105-08, and accom-
panying text.
130. For a discussion of the court's disregard of the district judge's finding, see supra notes
110-16 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the abandonment defense under the Lan-
ham Act, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
131. KiRKPATRIcK, supra note 33, at 2-18 to 2-19. "Generally, none of the factors by itself
is always decisive or even preeminent. Nor should any systematically receive undue emphasis
or excessive importance. The factors are interrelated and must be considered together as an
'amalgam.' They are not to be applied serially or mechanically as if they were independent of
one another." Id. at 2-18 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also AHP Subsidiary
Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611,616 (7th Cir. 1993) ("None of the seven confusion
factors alone is dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis."); Int'l Kennel Club v. Mighty
Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting no factor alone is dispositive of "likeli-
hood of confusion" question); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating Seventh Circuit has reversed lower court decisions that placed excessive
reliance on any one factor).
132. KiRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 2-18 to 2-19; McCARTHY, supra note 32, at
§ 24.06[4][a]. "Each of the circuits has emphasized in one way or another that no one of the
foundational factors is determinative, but rather that all are to be weighed and balanced one
against the other." Id. (citation omitted).
133. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947,959 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179 (1993). In Sands, Taylor & Wood, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The trial court's ultimate conclusion as to the likelihood of confusion is a finding of
fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. We do, however, "review
the district court's statement of the law de novo for legal error and its conclusions for
signs that the court's application of the law was infected with legal error."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding district court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff where applica-
tion of multi-factor test produced no clear "likelihood of confusion"); Forum Corp. of N. Am.
v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating Seventh Circuit review of district
court includes assuring confusion test was properly applied).
One Seventh Circuit decision has even suggested that "to the extent the determination [of
a 'likelihood of confusion'] is predicated on the similarity of the marks themselves, this Court
is in as good a position as the trial judge to determine likelihood of confusion." Henri's Food
Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976)). For the full
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The first factor, the similarity of the parties' marks, favors the de-
fendant.134 An inquiry beyond the names of the two teams "displays a
distinct difference between the parties' marks."'135 The Indianapolis
Colts' logo is a horseshoe,136 while the Baltimore CFL team's logo con-
sists of a silhouette of a horsehead and a mapleleaf to denote CFL affili-
ation.' 37 In other words, visually, the Indianapolis Colts' helmet is white
with a blue horseshoe, while the Baltimore CFL Colts' helmet is silver
with the profile of a horse's head.' 38 The parties' marks are essentially
distinct.
The second factor, the similarity of the products or services, presents
a more difficult analysis.' 39 While both parties engage in a similar ser-
vice, professional football, there are enough significant differences be-
tween the two to question their similarity.140 When compared with the
game played by the NFL, the game played by the CFL has been de-
scribed as more like "basketball on a football field," due to its much
list of the seven factors used by the Seventh Circuit in a "likelihood of confusion" analysis, see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
134. See Geise, supra note 16, at 571. In properly assessing the similarity of trademarks,
the two marks must be viewed separately because consumers typically rely on mental pictures
or symbols of the products they desire to purchase. EpsmmN, supra note 25, at 313.
135. Geise, supra note 16, at 571. See also Stuart Hale, 1 F.3d at 617 (in reviewing the
district court, Seventh Circuit analyzed visual similarities in parties' products); Kraft, 717 F.2d
at 355-56 (citing authority that comparison of labels rather than simply trademarks is appro-
priate and finding visual difference between labels is factor weighing against infringement).
136. O'Neill, supra note 22, at B1. Ironically, there is some debate as to who created the
plaintiff's logo. One observer wrote: "[a]s for the helmet logo, the horseshoes, the NFL and
its properties division had nothing to do with that either. It's not creative enough. The horse-
shoes were put there by a former Colts publicity director, Sam Banks, in 1954." Steadman,
supra note 10, at D1.
137. O'Neill, supra note 22, at Bi. In Indianapolis Colts, the plaintiff alleged in their
complaint that the defendant's logos and trademarks were "virtually identical" to those of the
Indianapolis Colts. Bonkowski, supra note 21, at CIO. However, "the long-standing Balti-
more/Indianapolis Colts logo is of a horseshoe, [while] the CFL Colts' logo is a silhouette of a
horse's head." Id.
138. O'Neill, supra note 22, at BI.
139. The Seventh Circuit has stated that the central question in analyzing the similarity
between the parties' products is "whether the products are the kind the public attributes to a
single source." Int'l Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 1988)
(citing McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th Cir. 1986)).
140. Murray, supra note 15, at DI:
If you have never seen a CFL game, one of the first things you will notice is the pace.
It may be the biggest difference in the American and Canadian games.
It is the product of three-down football, a 20-second clock between plays, unlimited
motion in the backfield and a 37-man roster. It is also the result of a field that's 111/2
yards wider and 30 yards longer than the NFL.
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quicker pace.14 1 In its discussion, the court recognized that the rules of
Canadian football are different from those of American football.142 The
court further noted that teams do not move from the NFL to the CFL, as
they might move from one conference to another within the NFL.143
These differences, taken together, should have prompted the court to
analyze the similarity of the parties' products. 44
The third factor, the area and manner of concurrent use, nominally
favors the plaintiff. 45 This factor weighs in the plaintiff's favor because
the defendant's games would be broadcast nationally and merchandise
sold nationally, as is done by the plaintiff.146 This overlap in the national
market is not complete, however, because the defendant's nationwide
broadcasts take place on cable television networks that do not broadcast
NFL games. 47 Moreover, the CFL season runs from June to November
while the NFL season runs from August to January. 48 The court carried
this potential overlap to an imaginative level in expressing a concern that
141. Id. (concluding CFL game is more like frenetic, full-court-press basketball on over-
sized football field). For a description of the CFL game's quicker pace, see supra note 140.
142. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412; see also Murray, supra note 15, at D1 (illustrating
significant differences in rules between the two games).
143. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412. Confusion is more obviously found when products
directly compete with each other. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 312 to 312.1. Here however,
there is no direct competition because the CFL and the NFL are two separate and distinct
leagues, playing dissimilar games.
144. The fact that the court itself noted some of the significant differences between the
parties' products, suggests that the court should have inquired into the similarity of the prod-
ucts. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1993) (making requi-
site inquiry into similarity of parties' products, and affirming district court even though parties
had not disputed issue).
145. Geise, supra note 16, at 571 (theorizing this is trivial factor which favors plaintiff).
According to the Seventh Circuit, "[this] factor requires [the court] to consider whether there
is a relationship in use, promotion, distribution, or sales between the goods or services of the
parties." Forum Corp of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing In re
Superior Outdoor Display, Inc., 478 F.2d 1388 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
146. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411-12 (explaining why defendant was within reach of
Indiana's long-arm statute for jurisdictional purposes).
147. Murray, supra note 15, at D1 (listing defendant's 1994 schedule and medium used for
telecast). The defendant's 1994 games were broadcast either locally in Baltimore, or on the
cable television networks "ESPN 2" and "Home Team Sports." Id. Neither of these two
networks broadcast NFL games. See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1230 (noting distinction that although
parties' markets may overlap, utilization of different marketing channels weighs against "like-
lihood of confusion").
148. Murray, supra note 15, at 1D. The CFL season begins with pre-season games in
June, and continues with regular season play through early November. Id. The season
culminates with playoffs and a championship game, the "Grey Cup," in late November. Ed
Hinton, Ticket to Ride: Though Baltimore Won the Grey Cup, It Must Look for a New Home,
SpoRTs ILLUsTRATED, Nov. 27, 1995, at 42, 45 (describing 1995 Baltimore championship vic-
tory). In contrast, the NFL season begins with pre-season games in August, continues with
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an unwary fan might mistakenly purchase a ticket to a CFL instead of an
NFL game.' 49
The fourth factor, the degree and care likely to be exercised by con-
sumers, realistically favors neither party because "[a] factor ordinarily
comes into play only to the extent that the record contains competent
evidence pertaining to it.' 150 In short, lack of evidence on a factor may
prevent any useful conclusion from being drawn.1 51 Here, the court ex-
pressed concern for "football illiterates" who might be easily confused,
but the court also admitted "that people are more careful when they are
laying out their money ...152 This contradiction suggests, therefore,
that no useful conclusion can be drawn concerning this factor.' 53
The fifth factor, the strength of the complainant's mark, arguably fa-
vors the plaintiff. 54 The court's observation of the institutional con-
tinuity of the Indianapolis Colts appears to support the plaintiff's claim
as to the strength of the trademark "Colts."' 55 When analyzing the
strength of a plaintiff's trademark, however, a court should assess the
"origin-indicating" quality of the mark in the eyes of the consuming pub-
regular season play through late December and concludes with playoffs and a championship
game, the "Super Bowl," in late January.
149. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 414. "One would have to be stupid to be misled or
confused" as to what league and what teams were represented at a professional football game.
See Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, 134 F.2d 429,432 (7th Cir. 1943) (noting person making
this sort of mistake "would be careless to a degree that the law has no duty to protect"). See
also Murray, supra note 20, at D8 ("When you see Baltimore vs. Toronto, Baltimore vs. Las
Vegas, the sports-knowledgeable public will not be confused.").
150, KIRKPATRIcK, supra note 33, at 2-20.
151. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1230-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting ab-
sence of evidence on degree of consumer care leaves factor open for interpretation in either
way).
152. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412, 416. In the Seventh Circuit, the "likelihood of
confusion" standard contemplates the "ordinary" consumers, rather than "careless" consum-
ers, Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1428 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
Learned Hand's formulation of standard as careless, rather than ordinary, consumer), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986). Those "football illiterates" whom the court worries might acci-
dentally buy a ticket to a CFL game instead of an NFL game, or watch a CFL game broadcast
thinking they are watching the NFL, clearly seem to fall in the careless consumer category,
therefore making the court's concern for them immaterial. See Quaker Oats Co. v. General
Mills, 134 F.2d 429,432 (7th Cir. 1943) ("Anyone deceived or confused by the plaintiff's pack-
age into believing he was getting the defendant's package would be careless to a degree that
the law has no duty to protect.").
153. Nike, 6 F.3d at 1230-31.
154. Geise, supra note 16, at 571 ("The strength of the plaintiffs mark is also conceded.").
155. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 413-14. For a full discussion of the court's observation
of the Indianapolis Colts' institutional continuity, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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lie.156 Therefore, the defendant should be able to rely on the district
court's finding that the Indianapolis Colts abandoned the trademark
"Baltimore Colts" to refute the plaintiff's claim as to this factor.157
The sixth factor, actual confusion, is generally shown through the use
of consumer surveys.158 Instead of evaluating the other six factors, the
court based its decision primarily on evidence pertinent to this factor.159
Even before examining this factor, however, the court voiced serious
concerns about the overall consumer survey system and the system's so-
called "experts."16
Thereafter, the court dismissed the defendant's survey,161 while, at
the same time, accepting the plaintiff's survey despite its many weak-
nesses. 62 It seems that the court expressed enough apprehension about
the plaintiff's survey that the survey should not have received the sub-
stantial weight it was given.16 3 In this light, the sixth factor should also
be deemed to favor the defendant. 64 However, if the sixth factor does
not clearly favor the defendant, the court attributed excessive weight to
156. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179 (1993). In Sands, Taylor & Wood, the Seventh Circuit character-
ized this factor by stating "[t]he term 'strength' as applied to trademarks refers to the distinc-
tiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark
as emanating from a particular ... source." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting McGregor-
Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)). See also EPSTEIN, supra
note 25, at 312 (suggesting strength of trademark reflects "origin-indicating" quality in eyes of
purchasing public).
157. For a full discussion of the defendant's argument pertaining to the district court's
finding of trademark abandonment, see supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the use of consumer survey evidence to demonstrate actual confu-
sion, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
159. Geise, supra note 16, at 570 ("The court of appeals devoted much of its opinion to
the importance of a survey in proving a likelihood of confusion."). For a full discussion of the
excessive weight the court placed on the plaintiff's survey, see infra notes 175-89 and accompa-
nying text.
160. For a description of the court's overall dissatisfaction with the consumer survey sys-
tem, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (describing court's dissatisfaction with
defendant's survey).
162. For a full discussion of the weaknesses that the court notes in the plaintiff's survey,
see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
163. See AN? Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1993)
(maintaining shortcomings in survey results go to proper weight of survey); McGraw-Edison
Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[judicial] concern regarding
the manner of presentation to the interviewee goes to the weight to be accorded to the survey
results"); see also Geise, supra note 16, at 572 (asserting Seventh Circuit's criticism was serious
enough to question survey's reliability).
164. Geise, supra note 16, at 572 (maintaining plaintiffs may not have shown factor of
actual confusion due to questionable reliability of survey).
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the survey evidence in what should have been a full analysis of the multi-
factor test.165
The seventh factor is the intent on the part of the alleged infringer to
"palm off" his products as those of another.166 The court conveyed a
certain suspicion that the defendants used the name "Colts" as part of an
intent to "palm off" the new team as related to the plaintiffs. 67 In con-
trast, the court had to explicitly concede that in the defendant's naming
of the new team, "there is no evidence that [this intent] was the dominant
or even a major consideration." 68 Additionally, the fact that the de-
fendant picked the name "Baltimore CFL Colts" only after discovering
and verifying that the plaintiff had failed to renew its federal registration
for the name "Baltimore Colts" also suggests no intentional infringe-
ment on the part of the defendant.169 Taken together, the fact that the
court could find no evidence of an illegitimate intent on the part of the
defendant and that the defendant took affirmative steps to properly reg-
ister the name "Baltimore CFL Colts," suggests that the defendant did
165. See Stuart Hale, 1 F.3d at 618 (asserting consumer surveys are evidence of actual
confusion, but actual confusion is only one factor in "likelihood of confusion" determination).
"None of the seven confusion factors alone is dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis."
Id. at 616; see also Int'l Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988)
(asserting no one factor alone dispositive of "likelihood of confusion" question); Piper Air-
craft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating Seventh Circuit re-
versed lower court decisions placing excessive reliance on any one factor). For a full
discussion of the excessive weight given to the plaintiff's consumer survey evidence, see infra
notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
166. The Seventh Circuit has held that, "the defendant's intent is relevant to the issue of
likelihood of confusion only if he intended 'to palm off his products as those of another,'
thereby profiting from confusion." Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d
947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434,439 (7th
Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179 (1993).
167. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412, 414. The court voiced its suspicion by stating:
"Certainly the [NFL's] Baltimore Colts had a national following, and we do not doubt that the
resonance of the name, and not merely the clamor of the Baltimoreans, motivated the Balti-
more team's choice of 'Colts,' out of all the appealing animals in the ark." Id. at 412. Simi-
larly, when expressing a concern that potential consumers might mistakenly purchase
Baltimore CFL Colts merchandise thinking it somehow related to the NFL's "glory days"
Baltimore Colts, the court stated that "tilt would be naive to suppose that no consideration of
such possibilities occurred to the owners of the new Baltimore team when they were choosing
a name." Id. at 414.
168. Id. (emphasis added). The owner of the new CFL team, James L. Speros, raised an
interesting point concerning his intent, which the court never considered, by stating: "[tihere
has been a lot of bitterness and anger ... If I'm associated in any way with the NFL in
Baltimore it does nothing but hurt me and my organization." Morgan, supra note 13, at 11C.
169. Geise, supra note 16, at 572. "[T]he defendants did not intend to sell their services as
those of the NFL, as they merely chose a name desired by their fans that was not already
registered." Id.
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not intend to profit from confusion by "palming off" its product as that
of the plaintiff.17
As illustrated, a full exploration of the multi-factor test used by the
Seventh Circuit shows that the majority of the factors favor the defend-
ant.17 1 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Indianapolis Colts was flawed
because the court only focused on evidence pertinent to one of these
factors to uphold the conclusion of a "likelihood of confusion.' 7  A
more reasoned approach by the Seventh Circuit would have included
analyzing all of the factors as applied to the facts of the case.173 A com-
plete analysis would have led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that the
district court's finding of a "likelihood of confusion" was clearly
erroneous.
74
B. Consumer Survey Evidence
In basing its decision primarily on the plaintiff's consumer survey, the
court mistakenly gave excessive weight to this factor.175 The modem
trend in trademark law considers surveys useful but not indispensable. 176
Moreover, "[m]any courts... are skeptical when it comes to survey evi-
dence, recognizing that it is difficult to assess the true reactions of con-
170. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 961. These two facts taken together also suggest
that the seventh factor favors the plaintiff. Geise, supra note 16, at 572 (claiming seventh
factor favors defendant).
171. Geise, supra note 16, at 572 ("Of the seven factors apparently utilized by the district
court, at least four arguably favor the defendants and a finding of no likelihood of
confusion.").
172. For a discussion of the court's excessive reliance on the sixth factor, actual confusion,
see supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
173. Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he court is
required to consider several factors when assessing whether or not there is a likelihood of
confusion by the general public."); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d
611, 616 (7th Cir. 1993) ("None of the seven confusion factors alone is dispositive in a likeli-
hood of confusion analysis."); Int'l Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th
Cir. 1988) (asserting no one factor alone is dispositive of "likelihood of confusion" question);
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating Seventh
Circuit reversed lower court decisions placing excessive reliance on any one factor).
174. For a description of the Seventh Circuit's standard of review for a district court's
"likelihood of confusion" analysis, see supra note 133.
175. See, e.g., Nike, 6 F.3d at 1228 (cautioning no one factor ends judicial inquiry into
"likelihood of confusion"). For a list of Seventh Circuit decisions criticizing the excessive
placement of weight on any one factor of the multi-factor test, see supra note 50. See also
KmKPAr RIcK, supra note 33, at 2-18 (warning no one factor should receive undue emphasis);
McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 24.06[4][a] (declaring no one "likelihood of confusion" factor
is determinative).
176. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 7-33 (citing RESTATEMENr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPE=TIION § 23 cmt. c (1995)).
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sumers in an artificial setting. '177  Consequently, the court's
overemphasis on the plaintiff's consumer survey seems to contradict the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's pronouncement that survey evi-
dence is only one factor to be considered in the overall determination of
likelihood of confusion. 178
Additionally, the amount of weight given to the plaintiff's consumer
survey seems excessive in light of the considerable criticism that the
court voiced.179 First, the court expressed a broad dissatisfaction with
the manner in which consumer surveys are conducted:' 80 The court de-
scribed the battle of experts that occurs between the parties to a trade-
mark dispute as "frequently unedifying.""" The court's most serious
concern, however, stems from the its suggestion that "[m]any experts are
willing for a generous.., fee to bend their science in the direction ftom
which their fee is coming.'8 2 This concern is particularly troublesome in
this case because the plaintiff paid a seventy-five thousand dollar fee for
its consumer survey.' 3 Curiously, the court recognized this fact as well
as the fact that both parties' experts had been criticized in previous judi-
cial opinions, yet it was still willing to place ample faith in the plaintiff's
expert. 184 Second, the court expressed apprehension about some of the
177. Helene D. Jaffe, Avoiding the Pitfalls: Use of Consumer Surveys in Lanham Act
Cases, ANTITRusT, Summer 1994, at 30. This artificial setting is apt to make consumers pay
closer attention than they might otherwise, overstate their reactions and be misled by subtle
suggestions contained in the questions. Id.
178. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at 7-33. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) is an administrative body affiliated with the Patent and Trademark Office. McCAR-
THY, supra note 32, at § 21.01. The TTAB acts as fact-finding decision-maker in cases arising
out of conflicts between private parties concerning the federal registration of a trademark. Id.
The TrAB acts as an appellate tribunal in cases arising out of conflicts between a private
applicant for registration and the Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
179. For a discussion of the court's general criticisms of the consumer survey system and
particular criticisms of the plaintiff's survey, see supra notes 104, 107 and accompanying text.
180. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415.
181. Id. The court was critical of the market which provides consultant services for law-
yers and commented that the market obviously has little control over the dubious practices of
some of its consultants. Id. The court supported this view by pointing to the fact that both the
plaintiff's and defendant's consumer survey experts in this case had been judicially criticized in
previous cases. Id. In spite of this, the court expressed that it had no doubt that both experts
were being generously renumerated for their suspect services. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. Morgan, supra note 13, at Cll ("The NFL produced a $75,000 survey of 726 people
in 24 cities that asserted consumers would be confused by having teams in different football
leagues with the same name."). Ironically however, "[s]ince 1954 .... [there have been] two
teams called the Lions, one in the CFL and one in the NFL, and nobody has ever mistaken
British Columbia for Detroit." CFL Colts Vow To Keep Name Despite NFL Suit, WASH. POST,
May 1, 1994, at D2 (quoting Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke).
184. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415. The court stated:
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particular aspects of the plaintiff's survey.185 Third, the court stated that
it had no doubt that it was inadvertently overlooking other tricks of the
survey researcher's "black arts."'1 6
In effect, the court seemed to choose the lesser of two evils, the plain-
tiff's survey. The court then offered the justification that judicial con-
straints on expert testimony are inherently weak because judges do not
have the necessary training or expertise in the relevant fields of expert
knowledge.8 7 The court complacently accepted this rationale because,
in its view, the existence of inherently weak judicial constraints on expert
testimony "is the system we have.' 88 Instead of accepting this situation,
the court should have responded to its general and particular uneasiness
with the consumer survey evidence by placing considerably less weight
on the plaintiff's survey, and placing greater consideration on the other
factors that are part of the multi-factor test. 8 9
C. Trademark Abandonment
The court erred by disregarding the district judge's finding that the
plaintiff abandoned the trademark "Baltimore Colts." Instead of giving
weight to this finding, the court focused on the contention that the plain-
tiff continued to market the same product or service under a similar
name.190 This contention is clearly contrary to the Lanham Act.191 The
The constraints that the market in consultant services for lawyers places on this sort of
[result bending] behavior are weak, as shown by the fact that both experts in this case
were hired and, we have no doubt, generously renumerated even though both have
been criticized in previous judicial opinions.
Id.
185. For a full discussion of the defects and biases that the court pointed to in the plain-
tiff's study, see supra note 107.
186. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416. The court indicated that it did not know what
these other tricks were. Id.
187. Id. at 415. The court's concern was not simply that judges lack the requisite knowl-
edge to understand the expert testimony, but rather that judges lack the proper understanding
to be able to control tendentious, or purposely slanted, expert testimony. Id.
188. Id. The court did mention a federally authorized alternative approach involving the
use of a third, neutral expert to conduct the surveys, but acknowledged that it had not been
utilized in the case. Id.
189. See AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1993)
(maintaining shortcomings in survey results go to proper weight of survey); McGraw-Edison
Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[judicial] concern regarding
the manner of presentation to the interviewee goes to the weight to be accorded to the survey
results.").
190. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412-13. For a full discussion of this contention, see
supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
191. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 954-55 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1179 (1993). "Because trademark rights derive from the use of a mark
1996]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Lanham Act states that nonuse for two years is prima facie evidence of
abandonment. 192 Here, the plaintiff had failed to use the trademark
"Baltimore Colts" for seven years after leaving Baltimore for Indianapo-
lis. 193 Furthermore, the plaintiff had allowed the federal registration that
it held for the trademark to lapse, indicating that they had actually aban-
doned the mark. 194 Consequently, these facts suggest that the defendant
was entitled to the affirmative defense of abandonment under the Lan-
ham Act.' 95
In rejecting the defendant's abandonment argument, the court
quoted a treatise on trademarks and intellectual property which states
that a subsequent user of an abandoned mark is required to take reason-
able precaution to prevent confusion with the previous user.' 96 How-
ever, the court explicitly admitted that it could find no precedent on this
point.197 In dismissing the defendant's attempt to clarify the team name
by inserting "CFL" between "Baltimore" and "Colts," the court implied
that the defendant failed to use the required reasonable precaution. 198
Additionally, the court suggested that the acronym "CFL" has none of
the instant recognition value of the acronym "NFL," and therefore
would not serve to ward off confusion.'99 It does appear inconsistent
that the court, in the same paragraph, expressed concern for "football
illiterates" who would be easily confused by acronyms, yet credited the
in commerce and not from mere registration of the mark, the owner of a mark will lose his
exclusive rights if he fails actually to use it." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
For a full discussion of the abandonment standard under the Lanham Act, see supra notes 70-
72 and accompanying text.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See also Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 955 (quoting
Lanham Act).
193. Geise, supra note 16, at 572. Cf. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th
Cir. 1989) (interpreting Lanham Act's purpose as preventing "hoarding" of trademarks where
owner has no intent to resume use within reasonably foreseeable future), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1075 (1990).
194. Geise, supra note 16, at 572-73. For a discussion of how this trademark came to be
unregistered, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
195. Geise, supra note 16, at 573. See Dovenmuehle v. Gilldom Mortgage Midwest Corp.,
871 F,2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Once a trademark or trade name is abandoned, it returns
to the public domain.").
196. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412-13 (citing McCARTHY, supra note 70, at
§ 17.01[2]).
197. Id. at 413,
198. Id. at 412. The court failed to offer an example of a reasonable precaution the Balti-
more CFL team could have taken in the alternative. This failure was caused by the court's
Inability to find any precedent addressing the issue of reasonable precautions taken by a sub-
sequent user of an abandoned mark where the former owner continues to market the same
product or service under a similar name. Id. at 413.
199. Id. at 412.
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acronym "NFL" with instant recognition value.2 0  The court also never
considered the defendant's choice of a visual logo that naturally accom-
panies a team's name.201 Taken together, the inclusion of the acronym
"CFL" and the selection of a different logo and color scheme seem to
suggest that the defendant took the reasonable precaution required to
prevent confusion with the plaintiff, and therefore made proper use of an
abandoned mark.
VI. IMPACT
The crisis developing in professional football, known as "Franchise
Free Agency," sets the stage for future trademark disputes over valuable
team logos and other trademarks.20 2 An NFL franchise that relocates to
another city, possibly hundreds of miles away, will not necessarily retain
its former name or logo.20 3 At the same time, the CFL is aggressively
pursuing expansion plans into major cities in the United States, including
cities that may be abandoned by the NFL.2 4 Owners of any CFL expan-
sion team in a city with a solid football-fan tradition will no doubt
feel heavy pressure to defer to these fans' wishes concerning the team
name or logo in order to make the team as successful and profitable
as possible.20 5 Naturally, the NFL will seek to block the CFL from
200. Id.
201. For a full discussion of the difference between the plaintiff's and the defendant's
visual logo, see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
202. For a full discussion of the professional football teams in the NFL considering reloca-
tion and the consequential coining of the phrase "Franchise Free Agency," see supra notes 2-4
and accompanying text.
203. King, supra note 2, at 32 (referring to NFL's Houston Oilers franchise, which is con-
sidering relocation to Nashville, as "Nashville Somethings" because "they won't be called the
Oilers").
204. Ken Murray, Speros Vows Fight Over Colts Name, BALxmMORE SUN, May 1, 1994, at
1C. The CFL's Baltimore team owner, James L. Speros, stated: "[The CFL's] expansion pro-
gram is going to move into many major cities. In the near future, we'll be in a number of NFL
cities." Id. Speros added that the CFL had already had talks about placing franchise teams in
Boston and Chicago. Id. Both Chicago and Boston (even though the New England Patriots
play twenty-five miles from the city) are cities whose NFL franchises are considering reloca-
tion. For a discussion of the NFL franchises that are currently considering relocation, see
supra note 2.
205. This heavy pressure to defer to fans' wishes played the dominant role in Speros'
selection of the name "Baltimore CFL Colts" for his expansion team. Ken Murray, Colts Suit
to Be Heard in Indiana, BALnMORE SUN, June 13, 1994, at Cl (quoting Speros: "I gave the
team the name the people chose ... I'm sticking to it. If they had picked Rhinos, I would've
gone with Rhinos."); see also Sottile, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining Speros "listened" to
Baltimore area fans and retained counsel to avoid legal battle with NFL); cf. Jean Marbella,
Root First, Ask Questions Later Is Rallying Cry of Un-Colts Fans, BALriMoRa SUN, June 29,
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initiating any action that may infringe upon its trademarks, past or
present.206
In Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club,
Ltd.,2 °7 the Seventh Circuit had the unique opportunity to establish a
workable legal framework through which these types of trademark dis-
putes would be litigated. Unfortunately, the court failed to take advan-
tage of this opportunity. As a result, the Seventh Circuit's decision will
likely provide improper guidance in similar sports trademark disputes.
The Indianapolis Colts decision focused primarily on consumer surveys,
instead of focusing on the proper multi-factor test to determine whether
there was a "likelihood of confusion. '20 8 Additionally, the court's disre-
gard of a valid affirmative defense will further obscure the matter.2 9
This lack of proper guidance could lead to erroneous conclusions
concerning trademark law's governance of sports trademarks. Instead of
taking the precautionary steps to meet the multi-factor test, a potential
litigant in a similar dispute may simply conclude that victory is ensured
by securing an expensive consumer survey that "has all the trappings of
social scientific rigor."2 10
As an ironic example, it is conceivable that one of the defendants in
Indianapolis Colts could be a potential litigant in a similar, future dis-
pute. The NFL's Houston Oilers have announced their intent to move
to Nashville.2 1' As a result, the owner of the CFL's Baltimore team, one
1994, at IC (describing several hundred person rally in Baltimore to protest federal prelimi-
nary injunction ordering CFL team to stop using name "Colts").
206. The trademark "Baltimore Colts" had not been used as the name of an NFL team for
over ten years when the NFL brought its trademark infringement action against the CFL's
Baltimore franchise. Ken Murray, NFL Sues to Block Use of "Colts," Canadian Expansion
Team in Baltimore Want the Nickname, PrrsBURGH Posr-GAzErrn, May 1, 1994, at D1
("The NFL believes it retains trademark rights to the name Colts, even though the team left
Baltimore 10 years ago.").
207. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
208. For a full discussion of the court's overemphasis on the consumer survey evidence
submitted to the lower court, see supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text. For a full discus-
sion of the court's deficient analysis of the multi-factor test, see supra notes 127-74 and accom-
panying text.
209. For a complete discussion of the court's disregard of the defendant's affirmative de-
fense of abandonment, see supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
210. Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415. The court explicitly voiced its concern that "ex-
perts are willing for a generous ... fee to bend their science in the direction from which their
fee is coming." Id. This concern lends credence to the assumption that the more expensive
the study, the better the chance of victory. For a full discussion of the court's concern about
the consumer survey system in general, and the parties' surveys in particular, see supra notes
104-05, 107 and accompanying text.
211. Hinton, supra note 148, at 42, 45. On November 16, 1995, the Houston Oilers an-
nounced their intent to move to Nashville. Hinton, supra note 148, at 45.
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of the defendants in Indianapolis Colts, has met with civic officials in
Houston concerning possible relocation.212 This situation leaves a very
real possibility of a trademark dispute similar to the one in Indianapolis
Colts.213 The lesson that Indianapolis Colts seems to teach the CFL's
Baltimore team, or any other CFL team expanding into a former NFL
city, is that a "likelihood of confusion" can be avoided merely by ob-
taining an expensive consumer survey.214
In deciding Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Foot-
ball Club, Ltd., the Seventh Circuit departed from its traditional ap-
proach in a trademark infringement action. This aberration is "likely to
confuse" future litigants in anticipated disputes over valuable trade-
marks in the professional football industry.
212. Hinton, supra note 148, at 45.
213. See King, supra note 2, at 32 (suggesting NFL's Houston franchise will not retain
name "Oilers" after moving to Nashville). The long-standing professional football fan tradi-
tion in Houston will no doubt bring to bear pressure on the owner of a CFL team to use the
name "Oilers," much the same as the Baltimore fans' cry for the name "Colts" when the CFL
granted their city an expansion team. For a discussion of ihe heavy pressure to defer to fans'
wishes in selecting the name of a professional team, see supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See also Lord, supra note 4, at 41 (quoting Baltimore Sun columnist as writing: "The Browns
name belongs in Cleveland, just as the Colts name belonged in Baltimore."); Rushin, supra
note 3, at 60 (relaying fans' wish that when Cleveland franchise relocates, it leaves "noble"
name in Ohio).
214. For a quotation of the court's concern about the reliability of survey evidence, from
which an inference can be drawn, see supra note 209.
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